Korogocho: The people of the “Illegal city”


Recent research shows that 30 to 60 per cent of the population of cities in developing countries live in irregular settlements[1]. In this further estimated that between 40 to 60 per cent of residents of cities in the developing world operate outside of the law[2].

The idea of illegal city therefore assumes a reality beyond constituting just a category. Kenyan slums, particulary those in Nairobi, are reputably among the worst in Africa. The stark reality of this is lived daily by the informal settlers of the sprawling Korogocho slums.

It has been estimated that 55 per cent of Nairobi’s residents live in informal settlements like one in korogocho, and these cover only 5.5 per cent of the city’s land[3]. Within Korogocho, the standard dwelling unit is one room, accomodating an avverage of 4 to 6 people. The rooms are built in barrack style blocks of temporary materials such as timber off cuts or mud and wattle are of very high density, tipically 250 units per hectare. Urban service are virtually non-existent, or else extremely basic. These consist of earth roads and pathways, rudimentary drains and communal water points and pit latrines shared by as many as 60 people.

These are woefully inadeguate, as the detestable phenomenon of “flying toilets” will serve to remind the unwary.

The land occupied by informal settlements is either public or private, and the owners of the structures normally have a legal or quasi-legal status. On public land, structure owners have temporary occupation licenses obtained from the local authority, or verbal permission to build and collects rent. Squatters in the classic sense of forceful occupation do thus not inhabit the majority of the informal settlements. This gives for a lot of patronage, and the resultant patron client relationships are a major obstacle to reform. Security of tenure precarious, violent evictions common. Current legislation on the rights of teants does not apply to informal settlements.

The much-touted ‘right to the city’ remains largely unattainable in Korogocho. Itmust,however, be stressedthat urban illegtality is not a preserve of the poor. In Korogocho, urban illegality has taken the forms of invasion, irregular land subdivisions and all other forms of precarious occupation, as well as rampant inciden ces of illegal construction. This may be attributed to a lack of efficient officvial housing policy and theimpact of runaway market forces..The central issue to be addressed appears to be that of property rights concerning urban real estaste. This may be implemented through an integrated process of re-location and regularization. Where in situ regularization proves impractical, then security of tenure dictates that households affected be given fair compensation or relocated in an orderly manner to another place whith comparable advantages. The way forward consists of a blend of reality and law which provides the framework of land rights and for their progressive realization and secure tenure for the urbanpoor.

Dismantling the illegal city is an arduous task ill.fitted to the faint hearted. As the stalled Mathare (IV)A Slum Upgrading Projeect has shown, great and confounding social and economic complexities have to be addressed if even modest success is to be achieved. There is spirited opposition from entrenched vested interests, who normally have connections to the business elite. Certain salient distillations, however, emerge which may serve to help address the problem. These are:

- The use of instruments that include constitutional consultation, organization of conferences, production of target group oriented material and round table discussions.

- In this field of action, program activities cannot succeed without the involvement of the state authorities. A full appreciation of this is necessary from the outset.

- Reforms should never be publicized in everry detail and with great political pomp as turnkey projects. Interests need to be well formulated before they can be presented in the political context.

- To Keep a reform project from flagging in the face of resistance, it must be led by a charismatic personage capable of persuading people and gaining support.

- Experience suggests that local reforms may be implemented successfully only if supported by a broad coalition of administrators, politicians, business-people and NGO representatives, and the local media. The ownership must, however, be by the beneficiry groups.

from "We are the People"

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